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ABSTRACT Upcoming smart scenarios enabled by the Internet of Things envision smart objects that expose
services that can adapt to user behavior or be managed with the goal of achieving higher productivity, often
in multi-stakeholder applications. In such environments, smart things are cheap sensors (and actuators) and,
therefore, constrained devices. However, they are also critical components because of the importance of the
provided information. Therefore, strong security is a must. Nevertheless, existing feasible approaches do
not cope well with the principle of least privilege; they lack both expressiveness and the ability to update
the policy to be enforced in the sensors. In this paper, we propose an access control model that comprises
a policy language that provides dynamic fine-grained policy enforcement in the sensors based on local
context conditions. This dynamic policy cycle requires a secure, efficient, and traceable message exchange
protocol. For that purpose, a security protocol called Hidra is also proposed. A security and performance
evaluation demonstrates the feasibility and adequacy of the proposed protocol and access control model.
INDEX TERMS Access control model, authorization, resource-constrained device, expressive policy
language, least privilege, message exchange protocol, mutual authentication, policy codification, sensor.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) concept involves an enormous
collection of novel services and applications, including ser-
vices that support dangerous processes such as critical infras-
tructure management [1]. In fact, the IoT concept conceives
an interconnected network of things, the smarter the bet-
ter, contributing to a higher awareness, enhanced decision
making, and more adaptive behaviour of systems supporting
any business process integrating pervasive and ubiquitous
ICT technologies. IoT also implies a massive deployment
of sensors and actuators, which, aiming at being cheap, are
implemented in a range of constrained devices, constrained
device sensors (CDSs) from now on, classified according
to [2]. Specifically, the IETF defines a range of CDSs from
class 0 (C0, less than 10KB of data and less than 100KB
of code), class 1 (C1, approximately 10KB data and 100KB
code), to class 2 (C2, 50KB, 250KB), with different purposes
and different features, where Moore’s law [3] is expected
to move more slowly and will have a greater impact on
price than on capacity [4], [5]. Moreover, depending on the
use case and location, they may require power autonomy,
and therefore, demand low power consumption mechanisms.
However, in such IoT applications, security (and more
specifically, access control) remains an insufficiently solved
need.
Within the IoT context two behaviours are distinguished.
On one hand, the usual behaviour of a CDS involves a push
operation in which the CDS publishes measurements and
events to a few large message brokers. Therefore, CDSs
behave as information producers. Consumer applications
query the message brokers rather than the CDSs directly to
obtain field information. Then, because the set of communi-
cating peers is reduced and known beforehand, the security
challenges of CDS push mode operations can be easily over-
come by preconfiguring static security associations.
On the other hand, more powerful IoT scenarios are also
developed, in which sensors also behave as tiny informa-
tion servers in pervasive computing environments in order to
support smarter and more manageable applications. In such
scenarios, requesting clients directly query the tiny informa-
tion servers implemented in the CDSs, establishing a secure
end-to-end (E2E) communication, and this proposal conveys
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FIGURE 1. Scenario schema where several stakeholders playing different roles access IoT applications on different IoT domains. The core shows the
functional decomposition view of the IoT reference architecture ARM [6], where security functional group is highlighted.
the mechanisms for the required fine-grained access control
enforcement.
Examples of the considered adaptive environments are
smart homes, smart offices, smart elite sports training, smart
hydrotherapy rooms, etc. Figure 1 shows an IoT schema
that conveys different roles in various deployed domains,
monitored and controlled through applications and fully
aligned with the functional decomposition view of the IoT
architecture reference model (ARM) [6]. All these uses
involve intelligent services on sensors accessible to either
end-users or process managers. These services on the sensors
allow some level of personalization to improve the user expe-
rience. For example, applications where a patient’s profile
is used to customize the sensitivity and configure the user
identity in a CDS that bulk-monitors health parameters.
Additionally, apart from supporting configuration by end
users, CDSs in such smart environments are also required
to deliver a set of management and maintenance services to
enable their operation to be tuned after deployment. Exam-
ples include themanufacturer updating the setup, owners con-
figuring domains, supporters performing maintenance tasks,
etc. to adapt the features of CDSs to their deployed context
such as in the case of critical infrastructures or Industry
4.0 factories. These use cases illustrate both the opportunities
and the challenges of the management services exposed by
CDSs.
In such contexts, the accuracy and correctness of the
information exchanged with CDSs is crucial. Protecting
this information requires the implementation of appropriate
security mechanisms that include fine-grained access con-
trol mechanisms based on expressive policies and that
can guarantee essential security properties such as con-
fidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity and non-
repudiation [7]–[10]. However, implementing these security
mechanisms in resource-constrained CDSs is not straightfor-
ward [11]. Indeed, currently, one of the key challenges for
enabling broader adoption of smart things is the availability
of feasible access control solutions.
In fact, in 2016, the Dyn cyberattack [12] caused multiple
DDoS attacks to many services originating from devices
connected to the Internet such as printers, cameras, etc. This
attack is a representative case that demonstrates the potential
disastrous impact of improper access control enforcement on
the management services on IoT devices, even if they are
not precisely constrained. Actually, vendors and manufac-
turers are not paying enough attention to security and this
issue is even worse in very constrained C0 and C1 CDSs.
Furthermore, proposals from the research community, have
addressed authentication in various ways, but authorization
has received little consideration. In short, the existing feasible
approaches for implementing access control mechanisms
lack sufficient expressiveness and, therefore, granularity,
as well as enforcement features.
Moreover, due to the extremely dynamic nature and pur-
pose of applications based on services in sensors, policy-
based security must be enforced locally in the CDSs. In fact,
security policies [13] allow security objectives to be modified
without changing the implementation of the involved entities.
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For this reason, policy based security is often used in systems
where flexibility is required because users, services and
access rights change frequently, or where context-based con-
ditions must be considered at enforcement time. A policy
language in these sorts of smart environments must not
only be highly expressive and easily extensible but also
lightweight.
The main contribution of this paper is a highly expressive
E2E access control model suitable for severely constrained
devices (C0 and C1 CDSs). In fact, the proposed attribute
based access control model (ABAC) conveys on one hand,
a new policy language and codification that are specifically
defined to provide expressiveness for authorization policies
and to be feasible for CDSs; and on the other hand, a new
protocol that enables secure provisioning and enforcement of
dynamic security policies as well as an audit trail.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related
works are presented in Section II as the state of the art. The
proposedABACmodel is specified in three sections, covering
1) the access control model architecture in Section III, 2) the
policy domain model based on a specific policy language
and policy codification definition in Section IV, and 3) the
message exchange protocol for dynamic policy life cycle and
runtime enforcement in Section V. The security evaluation
is discussed in Section VI and the performance evaluation in
Section VII. Finally, the main conclusions of the paper are
presented in Section VIII.
II. STATE OF THE ART
In the envisioned IoT scenarios, CDSs behave as servers
and requesting clients establish directly a secure E2E com-
munication with these tiny servers. The use of intermediary
proxies is avoided for several reasons. On one hand, proxies
are specific for each protocol or application and lack flexi-
bility for open scenarios. On the other hand, the use of an
intermediary such as a proxy implies the establishment of
two independent security associations, but for applications
supporting critical processes or when information with high
security considerations must be transmitted, it might not be
considered acceptable.
In such envisioned IoT scenarios, the networking stack is
supported by protocols adapted for network and transport lay-
ers such as CoAP [14], [15] and 6LowPAN [16], etc., which
mainly adhere to lightweight principles but do not always
adhere to security principles. Therefore, security remains the
main obstacle to the development of innovative and valuable
services [7], [10], [17]. According to Gartner, the security
problem is dissuading investors from full adoption of IoT
solutions [18]. In fact, knowing that security must focus
on network, transport and application layers with different
approaches and resulting granularity and robustness, past
research on security in wireless sensor networks (WSNs),
has concentrated on communication security, such as key
management, message authentication, intrusion detection,
etc. [19], [20]. However, fine-grained data and service access
control [21] has barely evolved until recently.
In the last few years, as IoT scenarios fostered by the
increasing smartness of CDSs have evolved, new security
requirements have arisen, among which fine-grained access
control enforcement in CDSs plays a crucial role. Although
this issue has been widely researched in the traditional
security literature, techniques developed for powerful work-
stations cannot be directly applied to IoT scenarios due
to the severe resource constraints of the devices acting as
information servers. Despite that restriction, inspiring tradi-
tional approaches for non-constrained device sensors (Non-
CDSs) are analysed. In fact, traditional authentication and
authorization solutions such as SAML [22], OAuth [23],
OpenID [24], Fido [25], [26], etc. solve the multi-factor
multi-domain access control problem but are based on
message exchanges that are not optimized for constrained
devices.
Additionally, in the envisioned scenarios, flexibility is
enabled by policy driven authorization approaches, and
according to Sloman [27], security policies define the rela-
tionship between subjects and targets. But there is always a
trade-off between the expressiveness of the policy and feasi-
bility. Moreover, traditional implementations such as Exten-
sible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [28],
Rei [29] and Ponder [30], although policy driven and very
expressive, are not feasible in CDSs [31]. As represented by
its level of adoption, XACML defines a generic authoriza-
tion architecture and a policy language for expressing and
exchanging access control policy information using XML.
Unfortunately, although XACML is complete, it is too heavy
for resource-deprived devices. For instance, specifying only
a single policy rule can easily require more than 50 lines of
text, which is a large amount of data for a policy that must be
processed locally by a CDS.
Regarding access control approaches specifically tailored
to IoT applications. Basically, these do not support expressive
(and, therefore, fine-grained and tight) security policy
enforcement. Furthermore, the currently implemented static
and coarsely grained policies are not well-suited for service-
oriented environments where information and management
access is by nature dynamic and ad-hoc. For feasibility
reasons, one approach could be a centralized architecture,
where a central server with no resource constraints makes
authorization decisions for each access request to a CDS
based on traditional standard mechanisms and protocols. This
approach could implement the most effective access control
policy languages but it doesn’t consider local context con-
ditions in CDSs. In addition, according to [32], it implies
high energy consumption as well as high network overhead
because requests and responses to on-line authorization deci-
sions must be transmitted through the network.
Analysing the distributed architecture approach, a recent
alternative to ABAC or role based access control
model (RBAC) is distributed capability based access con-
trol (DCapBAC) [33]. The authors of DCapBAC propose an
unforgeable token of authority, exchangeable as a capability,
that grants access to its possessor in a more agile way,
VOLUME 6, 2018 17
M. Uriarte et al.: Expressive Policy-Based Access Control for Resource-Constrained Devices
TABLE 1. Access control feasibility in CDSs classified by resource capabilities, where non-constrained devices are denoted by Non-CDS. An orange X
denotes not feasible, a green checkmark denotes capabilities that both are feasible and currently implemented, and a yellow G denotes unsolved gap.
as the capability based access control model implies [34].
This token includes a subject, permissions, a validity period,
and the authorization chain. The token is designed based
on an XML schema and the demonstrated scenarios are
developed in Java. Therefore, the server side can be con-
sidered a small device but not a constrained one. More-
over, security aspects such as entity authentication or dig-
ital signatures are not addressed. Therefore, it is not fea-
sible for application to CDSs in IoT resource-deprived
sensor networks. Nevertheless, DCapBAC is an interesting
model.
Capability based access control models have been adopted
by some other initiatives involving technologies specifically
designed for IoT environments. Some authors propose a
fully distributed approach in which the CDSs can make
authorization decisions autonomously [35], [36] that have
been successfully applied to smart building scenarios [37].
These proposals are based on an optimized version that
uses the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA)
to enable public key cryptography (PKC) in CDSs to
ensure E2E authentication, integrity and non-repudiation
without requiring the intervention of any intermediate entity.
Specifically, PKC enables autonomous key establishment
among peers and fits well in large scale IoT E2E scenarios.
The capabilities (also referred to as tokens or tickets) may
additionally include some contextual conditions expressed as
type, value, units tuples, that can be evaluated locally in the
CDS after the capability has been validated.
Nevertheless, these approaches present several drawbacks.
First, they do not sufficiently address the commissioning
processes of the capabilities, namely, the lifecycle covering
multiple generations, the delivery conditions and constraints,
or usage and revocation. In any case, the required local
conditions are static because the refresh of the capability is
not addressed, and thus, changes in the status of resources in
CDSs and changes in context are not covered. Furthermore,
considering the policy language, obligations are not sup-
ported, and condition checking is limited to matching static
values, since it does not support expressions. In addition,
while successful validation has been conducted in C2 CDSs
with 32-bit CPUs, due to the computational cost and the
energy consumption related to the PKC and the length of
the capabilities, this approach is not feasible in C0 and
C1 CDSs [2], [38].
An aligned alternative approach by the IETF, is the
delegated CoAP authentication and authorization frame-
work (DCAF) [39]. This approach is based on using a token to
distribute pre-shared keys. Then, if authorized, a handshake
is performed to establish a DTLS channel. Authorization
policies are specified as local conditions to be checked as
attributes. Additionally, the JSON representation for policies
has been enhanced through CBOR serialization [40] with the
goal of compacting the payloads in the CoAP protocol, and
specifically, to compress the length of the capabilities and
the enclosed policies based on conditions on attributes. But
because CBOR is a general-purpose serialization solution,
the resulting compression is still not sufficient for the C0 and
C1 CDSs considered in the envisioned scenarios; it is feasible
only in C2 CDSs.
An object security architecture (OSCAR) for IoT was pro-
posed in [41]. This scalable approach enables E2E secure
access control mechanisms based on PKC that support mul-
ticast, asynchronous traffic, and caching. However, OSCAR
suffers from the excessive overhead required by DTLS hand-
shakes. Alternatives to avoid this excessive overhead imply
delegating the session key establishment process to interme-
diate entities, which is undesirable from a security point of
view. In addition, because a detailed overview of the access
control mechanisms was only vaguely discussed, require-
ments such as local context checking or launching obligations
were not addressed.
As a completely different alternative approach, the usage
control model [42] and the attribute based policy schema [43]
extend traditional non-constrained access control systems,
in which the decision to grant access is made before the first
access occurs rather than during it, by continuously protecting
the resources during access and considering consumption
activities. This approach includes obligations such as usage
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control, but does not include a proposal addressing its feasi-
bility in any CDS class.
Therefore, Table 1 conveys the feasibility of the afore-
mentioned access control models ordered by their restrictive-
ness as well as some additional features that may or may
not currently exist for each CDS class. To summarize,
1) traditional access control solutions are not feasible in all
constrained devices (C0-C2 CDSs); 2) recent access control
solutions designed for constrained devices can be imple-
mented only in C2 CDSs and lack policy expressiveness;
3) access control solutions currently feasible in C0 CDSs are
based on authentication and very coarse grained and static
policies, scale badly, and lack a feasible policy based access
control solution. Moreover, no access control solution exists
with either accounting or usage control functionalities for any
CDS level (C0-C2).
Therefore, no suitable solution currently exists that can
provide expressive, policy based, fine-grained authoriza-
tion services in the envisioned scenarios of constrained but
manageable sensor networks. Thus, the aim of this work is to
cover the gap in the current state of the art by defining an E2E
access control model suitable for C0 CDSs and extensible to
C1 and C2 CDSs that solves the poor expressiveness in the
existing access control solutions. Additionally, the proposed
access control model enables instant provisioning of a custom
policy and adds some mechanisms for accurate accounting,
with the goal of supporting complete tracking and further
auditing as well as flushing local storage.
III. ACCESS CONTROL MODEL
As discussed above, the proposed E2E access control model
consists of 1) a combination of a centralized and distributed
enforcement architecture to enable multi-step authorization,
2) a policy language and codification that are specifically
designed to provide expressiveness for authorization policies
while maintaining feasibility in CDSs, and 3) a protocol
that enables the provisioning and enforcement of a dynamic
security policy as well as comprehensive accounting.
A. ACCESS CONTROL SCENARIO
The conceived network scenario consists of a set of severely
constrained CDSs that publish some services. These services
can be accessed by subjects through IP networks. Regarding
the networking stack, at the link layer, these CDSs com-
municate with a more powerful base station using specific
protocols such as IEEE 802.15.4 [44], which covers short
ranges and enables low bit rates. At the network layer, each
CDS implements IPv6/6LoWPAN,making it able to establish
IP communicationswith any device in the Internet without the
need for intermediary proxies.
There are three basic actors in the access control scenario: a
subject 1), constrained or not, which intends to access
a management service as a resource in a CDS 2), with
the collaboration of a trusted third party in a step to
establish a security association, namely an access control
server (ACS) 3).
FIGURE 2. Access control scenario.
When a subject wishes to access a resource in a CDS,
the well-known three-tier architecture explained in Subsec-
tion III-B is adopted. Figure 2 shows a simplified schema of
the actors involved, aligned with the IoT reference stack [45].
The trusted third party, that is, the ACS, supports
most of the features needed for a complete access con-
trol chain such as registration, identification, authentication,
authorization, accounting, tracking, auditing and reporting.
Specifically, most resource-intensive features rely on the
ACS, which performs identity management, cross-domain
federated authentication, preliminary authorization, policy
life cycle management, and other tasks in the access control
chain. This approach allows the usage of standard security
and access control technologies that are not feasible given
the severely constrained resources of CDSs. This approach
also means that most unauthorized access attempts will be
refused at this step, avoiding large numbers of unsuccessful
message exchanges with the CDSs, and saving energy, which
is a crucial aspect. Furthermore, this approach also enables
unified and coherent policy management.
In addition to preliminary policy-based authorization,
involving strong authentication, another notable feature of the
ACS is to fetch, wrap, and inject the local context based policy
to be enforced in the CDS. This policy, as well as the issued
credentials, can remain valid for some defined period of time
after the security association establishment, and it may cover
granting rules related to a request, a session, a workflow, and
so on in an E2E secure interoperability. Related to instant
provisioning, the ACS also initiates accounting, tracking and
auditing records based on the first interactions with subjects.
These records are later completed by adding further records
about E2E access sessions supplied by the CDS, which pro-
vides notifications of who performed what, where, when, and
under which policy rule.
The CDS support the complementary security features that
are needed to enable E2E dynamic and flexible access control
based on local context. These features include authentica-
tion validation, secondary local-context based authorization,
tracking and accounting communications. These features
apply not only during the establishment of the security asso-
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FIGURE 3. Access control architecture.
ciation but also for each derived resource access performed
by the subject.
This proposed multi-step enforcement approach, which
combines centralized and distributed access control architec-
tures, adopts the benefits derived from each and makes E2E
security both feasible and efficient in CDSs.
B. ACCESS CONTROL ARCHITECTURE
The proposed access control architecture consists of two
parts: a standardized cross-domain access control central
checkpoint as an initial mandatory filter, namely, the ACS,
which is not resource-deprived, and a distributed checkpoint
in each CDS, that enables dynamic and fine-grained access
control, based on local context.
The aforementioned security features are covered by
several components located in the three actors involved in the
scenario. Figure 3 shows a more detailed view of the architec-
ture of the proposed access control model, which is compliant
with the IoT ARM [6], and whose concepts were inspired by
non-constrained standards such as the Policy Core Informa-
tion Model (PCIM), Kerberos, XACML, SAML, and OAuth.
In the ACS, strong authentication is performed by the
authentication server (ANS), as depicted in Figure 3 (Step 1).
For clarity, related registration and identitymanagement com-
ponents, which are responsible for the identity repository, are
not represented in Figure 3. When a subject requests a ticket
to access a resource on a CDS, a preliminary authorization
is performed in the authorization server (AZS), where the
granting decision is made in a policy decision point (PDP)
decoupled from the policy enforcement point (PEP) as in
XACML, and depicted in Figure 3 (Step 2). There are
two other complementary components in the AZS that
support PDP decisions: the policy repository administration
point (PAP) and the policy information point (PIP). A repos-
itory for unified policies is also included. This repository
stores policies for CDSs instantiated according to the policy
language defined in this proposal. The proper policy instance
is provisioned in the CDS as depicted in Figure 3 (Step 2’).
In this manner, policy consistency is maintained but remains
amenable to be edited, maintained, checked, changed and
provisioned as needed. The policy language and the pol-
icy domain model, defined in this proposal to enable the
instantiation of expressive but feasible policies to be enforced
in the CDSs, are discussed in Subsections IV-A and IV-D
respectively.
The credential manager (CM) component generates and
releases resource tickets with the credentials of the authen-
ticated and preliminarily authorized subjects. Repositories
with credentials, namely tickets and cryptographic keys, and
accounting records, which are initiated when tickets are
issued, are also included in the architecture. The additional
components of the ACS that cover accounting, tracking, and
auditing are grouped in the Accounting Manager (ACM).
A related repository to record any activity to be further
analysed is also included.
All these highlighted components are integrated into the
ACS, while tailored PDP and PEP are deployed in each CDS.
In fact, a customized PDP engine is deployed in each CDS.
When a security association request arises, the PDP checks
the enclosed resource ticket and local conditions specified in
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the related policy instance to make a local decision to grant
access, as depicted in Figure 3 (Step 3).
PDP granting decisions, additional obligations and policy
re-evaluation functions are then enforced by the PEP in
the CDS and notifications are sent to the ACS as depicted
in Figure 3 (Step 4). When deploying a PDP in each CDS,
the PDP engine and the policy language can be at a lower
abstraction level and, therefore, specific to the CDS system
being protected, making implementation simpler and more
efficient, and allowing more granular policies. Additionally,
local PDP-PEP communications reduce the time required
to obtain decisions granting access. The runtime overhead
introduced by custom policy instance deployment is reduced
because of the small size of policy instance codifications,
as explained in Subsection IV-C. The impact of this approach
is much lower than opting to store all the potential policies in
the CDSs, which is in fact unfeasible. It is also a more effi-
cient option than querying a central PDP for every resource
request, an approach that would underperform due to network
dependencies and delays and would consume much more
energy. This is because, according to [32], sensor energy
consumption related to network transmission/reception oper-
ations is three orders of magnitude higher than energy con-
sumption related to logic processing operations, as explained
in Section VII which presents validation measurements.
Deploying PDP in the CDS, combines the advantages of
central unified policy administration, instantaneous policy
instance customization, and local decision making. This
enables the dynamic delegation, request, cancellation and
revocation of permissions. This is performed by refreshing
the instant policy instance during each E2E security
association establishment phase and can be performed during
the lifetime of a security association. The updated policy is
then enforced autonomously in the CDS through the deployed
PDP and PEP when any request arises.
These components of the access control architecture enable
a feasible multi-step authorization in which the main contri-
bution is the policy language, its codification and the policy
domain model. The three of these, discussed in the remain-
ing sections, empower the instantiation of the fine-grained
policies to be enforced in CDSs to comply with the principle
of least privilege, their feasibility in resource-constrained
CDSs (C0, C1) and their scalability respectively. Therefore,
they endow the proposed E2E access control model with the
flexibility derived from an expressive policy driven authoriza-
tion scheme.
IV. AUTHORIZATION POLICY LANGUAGE
This section defines an expressive policy language whose
goal is to enable the enforcement of more restrictive access
control policies in the CDS that overcome the resource con-
straints. In fact, this policy language definition enables CDSs
to make granting decisions based on local context conditions
and to react accordingly to requests.
This policy language adopts the deontic concepts of
rights, prohibitions, and obligations; and it is declarative,
(i.e. interpretation follows one previously declared logic)
instead of the procedural approach, where a policy instance
also includes the steps to follow to produce a result, as dis-
cussed in [13].
This policy language was inspired by the full expressive-
ness of the solutions applied to non-constrained devices.
It can be considered a subset of the XACML policy language.
Although it does not include all the features of XACML,
it does include a simpler definition of the most useful ones.
The design decisions were made by balancing expressiveness
and feasibility in C0 CDSs.
A resulting policy instance is defined, as in the gen-
eral event-condition-action approaches, as an optional set
of rules that specify both the conditions to be checked
and the related reactions at enforcement time. Specifically,
this policy language stands for a sequence of constructs
with specific meanings at decision-making and enforcement
time. The order of the sequence is crucial to its correct
interpretation.
A. AUTHORIZATION POLICY LANGUAGE CONSTRUCTS
On one hand, some of the constructs are defined as manda-
tory, and some others as optional, which can reduce the length
of the policy when a use case requires only a simple policy
instance. This defined policy elasticity is a crucial charac-
teristic which supports adjusting policy length to use case
requirements. Policy length is a key performance indicator
of access control approaches in CDSs: the shorter a policy is,
the better the performance is; therefore, policy length impacts
feasibility and promotes higher autonomy.
On the other hand, some constructs are extended through
other nested constructs, and some can be instantiated many
times within a container construct.
The more constructs a policy supports, the higher its
expressiveness is. Similarly, the more granular a policy is,
the tighter its enforcement can be. Below, the defined con-
structs are described along with their nesting relationship.
The main construct is the policy construct, which is manda-
tory in any policy instance.
1) POLICY CONSTRUCT
The policy construct enables a policy instantiation, which
contains three nested constructs.
First, a policy instance identification, id, must be specified
for logging, tracking and auditing purposes. Then, a default
policy granting effect is specified. This effect prevails in the
absence of other applicable rules, or when any rule evaluation
conflict occurs. This construct is useful in most simple policy
instances that have no rules, where authentication or even pre-
liminary authorization in the ACS is sufficient to grant access
for a request. It is also useful for revocation notification and
related security association finalization. Finally, optionally,
an array of rules comprising a ruleset may be instantiated to
specify additional conditions and related reactions. Each rule
in the array is an extensible construct that will be detailed in
Subsection IV-A.2.
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TABLE 2. EBNF representation of a schematic policy.
FIGURE 4. Policy construct definition.
FIGURE 5. Rule construct definition.
The three constructs that constitute a policy, their con-
tent, and their optionality are also represented in Extended
Backus-Naur Form (EBNF) notation, as listed in Table 2.
EBNF is nowadays one of the two main notation techniques
used to describe computer language syntax such as policy
languages [46]. EBNF enables meaningful constructs to be
represented along with expandable, nesting and repetitive
constructs, as needed.
The three constructs that constitute a policy, their content,
and their optionality are represented in a graphical view
in Figure 4. The graphical view is an equivalent representa-
tion and it will be used hereafter to enhance clarity.
Note that the simplest policy instance is one that
grants or denies access but requires no further rules. The
length of such a simple policy instance is minimal, as dis-
cussed in Subsection IV-C.
2) RULE CONSTRUCT
A rule construct is defined as a sequence of eight nested con-
structs whose order is crucial. Some of these constructs, such
as id, effect, and conditionset, are mandatory, and the rest,
named periodicity, iteration, resource, action and obligation-
set, are optional. The sequence of the constructs, their content
and their optionality in a rule are presented in Figure 5.
The conditionset and the obligationset are arrays of
expressions and obligations, respectively. These repeatable
and extensible expression and obligation constructs are
described in separate subsections.
Starting from the top left, the mandatory constructs in
a rule are the identifier id (1), and the granting effect (2)
of the rule. These two constructs must appear first in any
rule and are key values for further tracking and auditing
purposes.
Then, the optional constructs named periodicity (3)
and iteration (4) govern the rule’s evaluation behaviour.
Periodicity determines how often the rule must be evalu-
ated, and iteration determines how many times it must be
evaluated. The combination of these two constructs enables
rule evaluation not only before an access request occurs but
during or even after the request, and constitute a way to acti-
vate and expand the potential of obligations (explained later).
In any case, they allow rules to require reiteration and support
temporal constraints such as expiration checks. Both the timer
and the counter for rule re-evaluation are implemented as part
of the PEP, which will invoke the PDP for decision making
and enforcement feedback.
Then, optional constructs related to the targeted resource
(5) and requested action (6) identifications can be instantiated
to govern rule matching. This matching feature allows speci-
fying several rules in a unique policy specification that protect
several different resourceswith different actions or intentions.
Policy instances containing different rules are exchanged just
once per authentication and preliminary authorization pro-
cess in the ACS as explained in Section V. This approach not
only enables evaluating the correct rule when establishing a
security association but also evaluating the appropriate rule at
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FIGURE 6. Definition of the expression in a condition set.
FIGURE 7. Obligation construct definition.
each further resource request, while the security association
is still in effect. Any conflict that occurs between different
rules is avoided by applying the most restrictive approach
(i.e. final granting decision is permit only when the effect of
all the evaluated applicable rules is permit).
Then, the conditionset construct (7) is mandatory. A con-
ditionset is defined as an array of extendable expressions
as detailed in Subsection IV-A.3. The definition of expres-
sions as conditions to be checked enables the specification
of more expressive conditions than do existing approaches,
as explained in Section II.
Finally, the obligationset construct (8) provides a way to
specify specific reaction to a rule match, allowing advanced
features such as precise logging, active accounting, system
blocking, transaction-level control implementation, usage-
based authorization, etc. Note that even the simplest action
such as updating a counter or an attribute value may modify
the result of further rule evaluations specified by iteration
constructs, as discussed above. The combination of both
obligationset and iteration, enables the adaptation of CDS
security to activity, use and context evolution, increases the
expressiveness, and paves the way to smart access control
enforcement in smart CDSs.
3) CONDITIONSET CONSTRUCT
This mandatory extendable rule construct enables defining
an array of expressions that should be evaluated (as opposed
to the currently available simple static matches of vari-
able name, value and type tuples that imply longer strings
with less expressiveness). In fact, an expression, equiva-
lent to one condition, is a function identified by an iden-
tifier id, that accepts an array of optional attributes and
can be instantiated as shown in Figure 6. These functions
can be drawn from a rich library of logical, arithmetic,
textual, relational, comparison, etc. operations supported
by CDSs, as well as available custom functions developed
for specific purposes; all of these are indexed in appropri-
ate tables. Moreover, these reference tables are defined as
part of the policy domain model (PDM), as explained in
Subsection IV-D.
The attribute construct is defined as a nested construct of
the inputset construct in Subsection IV-A.6.
4) OBLIGATIONSET CONSTRUCT
The obligationset, which is an optional extendable rule con-
struct, enables the definition of an array of obligation tasks
to be launched consecutively, depending on whether the
granting decision of the rule is DENY, PERMIT, or for either
case, ALWAYS, as shown in Figure 7.
The construct named task, which is nested in an obligation
construct, is described in Subsection IV-A.5.
5) TASK CONSTRUCT
The task construct, which is mandatory in an obligation
instance, enables the specification of a function to be exe-
cuted as an obligation. A task is a function referred to by
an identifier, id, that accepts an array of optional attributes,
and it can be instantiated as an expression in a condition,
which follows the structure shown in Figure 6. As is the case
with expressions in a conditionset, the functions referred to
by a task may belong to a rich library of logical, arithmetic,
textual, relational, comparison, etc. operations supported by
CDSs, as well as custom functions developed for specific
purposes; all these are indexed in appropriate tables as shown
in Figure 9. In fact, these reference tables are defined as part
of the PDM, as explained in Subsection IV-D.
6) INPUTSET CONSTRUCT
An inputset, which is an optional construct invoked in an
expression or in a task, enables the specification of an array
of attributes considered as input arguments. An attribute is
a type-value pair. Figure 8 shows a list of defined attribute
types in which well-known types are complemented with
some indirect references. These three reference types are
address attributes related to a request, attributes related to
the system, and attributes related to the results of current
expression evaluations.
Request references enable addressing any additional
attributes related with the subject, the action or the resource
involved in a request. Related to the subject, not only the user
namemay be checked for accounting purposes, but additional
attributes concerning the origin such as source IP, device type,
location, authentication method, etc. can be checked during
the granting decision. Similarly, during the request, input
parameters related to the requested action or resource can be
checked during the granting decision.
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FIGURE 8. Attribute construct definition.
FIGURE 9. Policy domain model.
Local references enable the reuse of the results of previ-
ously evaluated expressions as inputs to expressions, or as
inputs to tasks, enabling higher expressiveness through
correlated conditions and obligations. Local references, com-
plemented by system and request references enable higher
expressiveness through more contextual conditions and obli-
gations. These reference types also allow managing not
only single-valued attributes (atomic) but also multi-valued
attributes (set-valued), because expressions and tasks using
these reference types as inputs can expect such input.
The resulting output is expected to be an atomic Boolean.
This feature is very useful when working with blacklists,
revocation lists and so on.
These sets of attributes enable flexible and expressive
ABAC model implementations, allowing checks not only of
fully expressive local instantaneous context conditions but
also historical conditions.
B. POLICY INSTANCE
All the nested constructs in the main construct named policy
defined so far enable the instantiation of an expressive policy.
This policy instance is evaluated in the PDP in the CDSs,
triggered during the first occurrence of an event, usually a
request. Consequently, local conditions are checked accord-
ing to thematched rule. Then, proper reactions are performed,
which include enforcing the granting decision and executing
corresponding obligations.
This policy language can be used to implement most ex-
tended access control models (i.e., RBAC andABACmodels)
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using the same sets of constructs in different domains, leading
to simpler policy instances and more uniformity.
Any policy instance that follows the policy definition in
this section is a text file that can be generated in different
formats, stored and processed by information systems, and
edited by human administrators.
The policy expressiveness proposed in this section would
be useless if the length of the resulting policy instances
were too long. This proposal provides a policy codification
to compress the policy length. The compression supports a
gain in expressiveness and limits the impact on storage and
energy consumption. The codification of the policy instances
is defined in the following section.
C. POLICY LANGUAGE CODIFICATION
This section specifies a codification of the policy instances
that notably reduces the lengths of policy files. The goal
of this codification is to generate the minimum possible
bit stream, starting from a textual policy instance generated
following the policy language format explained in Section IV.
Proposed policy codification is distinct from existing pro-
posals that serialize policy instances through standardized
open solutions such as CBOR. The available existing serial-
ization approaches do not optimize the agreed-upon common
understanding of the constructs by means of their sequence,
their meaning, their type, their scope, or the policies’ elas-
ticity. Consequently, the compression ratio of currently avail-
able approaches is below the ratio resulting from the policy
codification proposed in this section.
Therefore, this proposed policy instance codification takes
advantage of pre-existing knowledge of the agreed-upon
sequence of the constructs and their format. An additional
crucial factor is not only the bit conversion of the content
of the constructs, but the injection of some predetermined
bit masks that specify whether optional constructs exist.
This approach optimally considers the elasticity defined in
the policy language; by avoiding unused optional fields of
expressive policies, it greatly reduces policy length. Thus,
the proposed policy bit codification significantly shortens the
length of policy instances to be provisioned in the CDSs dur-
ing the establishment of a security association as introduced
in Subsection III-B, making dynamic policy cycles feasible
and avoiding having to store large policies in the CDSs.
Because it accounts for policy formats, the policy codifi-
cation specified in this subsection can easily be applied to
any original policy instance format (XACML, JSON, etc.),
from plain text files to structured policy instance representa-
tions. Policy codification is specified in the next subsections,
taking as input a JSON representation of the policy, which is
considered pertinent for two reasons. First, JSON is a broadly
adopted format of the payload in CoAP, which is a specialized
web transfer protocol designed specifically for constrained
devices [14], [15]. Second is clarity, because JSON is simple
and readable by humans.
To explain the specific codification and derived optimiza-
tions, the codification is explained in detail for the policy and
rule constructs, and it can be looked up in the Appendix for
the rest of the nested constructs.
1) POLICY CONSTRUCT CODIFICATION
The policy construct consists of three nested constructs,
where ruleset is expandable. Table 3 shows the binary repre-
sentation resulting from the codification of a human-readable
and editable policy instance represented in JSON.
The policy related constructs are cited in the leftmost
column in Table 3. The JSON representation is presented in
the second column and has been split into rows for clarity.
Each row is a field containing, on one hand, the construct
label, and on the other hand, the characters used as JSON
separators.
According to the policy language definition, some con-
structs are mandatory and others are optional, and so are the
related fields (i.e., labels and separators), as presented in the
third column. Due to the strict order in the construct sequence,
most fields can be omitted in the resulting bit stream. For
optional constructs, some additional bits are injected in the
binary representation to indicate their existence, as specified
in the third column. This bit injection allows compressing the
policy stream to the minimum, enabling the policy elasticity
as a key feasibility and scalability characteristic. Some other
injected bits are used to specify the number of elements in
the arrays of nested constructs. Again, codification adds only
meaningful fields to the final policy bit stream.
The fourth column shows the codified binary representa-
tion, while the fifth column shows the description, including
bit ranges; therefore, related length can be easily derived.
Any resulting policy bit stream will always start with the
binary value of the policy identifier, followed by an effect
binary code, and a mask named RuleExistenceMask that
specifies whether rules have been instantiated. When Rule-
ExistenceMask indicates that rules are present, an array with
at least one rule is expected and codified. The maximum rule
index is used to specify the number of rules within the array
and codified through the injected MaxRuleIndex value. Rule
codification is expanded in Table 4.
Note that this codification specification applies some
agreed-upon conventions that are included in the PDM spec-
ification. In fact, the policy codification table shows that the
maximum number of rules in a policy is eight. This decision,
taken as a sample, may cover most use cases in CDSs, but
in any case, it can be easily adjusted to particular use cases,
by means of parametrization of the PDM, as explained in
Subsection IV-D.
2) NESTED CONSTRUCTS CODIFICATION
Nested constructs such as rules are all codified in the same
way and are specified in Table 4, which contains the same
columns as Table 3, but some rows related to omitted texts
are compressed.
Within the rule construct, the rule identifier is the first
coded value, followed by the rule effect code, and a mask
of five bits that specifies the existence of the five optional
constructs.
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TABLE 3. Policy codification.
TABLE 4. Rule codification.
When the optional periodicity construct exists, a value
specifying the time (for example in minutes) between iter-
ations is coded. And when the optional iteration construct
exists, a value specifying the number of repetitions is coded.
Similarly, when the optional resource and/or action con-
structs exist, the resource and/or action identifier is coded,
respectively.
Conditions are mandatory and are codified as an array
containing at least one expression. For clarity, as an
example, eight conditions are estimated to be sufficiently
expressive; therefore, the maximum index in the array of
expressions [0-7],MaxExpressionIndex, is injected to specify
the number of instantiated expressions [1-8]. In any other
use cases, the maximum number of conditions could be
easily adjusted, by means of parametrization of the PDM,
as explained in Subsection IV-D.
When obligations exist, an array containing at least one
is expected. The number of obligations is expressed before
the details of the obligation are codified. The injected maxi-
mum index value, MaxObligationIndex, will be used by the
decoder to deduce the number of obligations.
The rest of the nested constructs such as obligations, tasks,
expressions, inputs and attributes are codified in a similar way
and they are conveyed in Anex VIII.
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TABLE 5. References and constants.
All of the agreed-upon definitions, such as the maximum
number of elements in the arrays of rules, expressions, input
attributes, obligations, and so on, which represent a good
balance between functionality and performance, are also
included in the PDM specification.
D. POLICY DOMAIN MODEL
There is a trade-off between the expressiveness and the length
of the policy instance, because the policy length results from
the expressiveness required by the use cases.
The maximum length of the codified policy bit stream,
including the maximum possible rule length that recur-
sively includes all optional constructs and the highest values,
is 1024 bytes. Even though a length of 1024 bytes is not
acceptable for every CDS, it covers the required expressive-
ness in most use cases. In any case, this total length of a cod-
ified policy could be assumable in less-constrained devices.
Moreover, the length can be modulated through some
assumptions defined in the policy domain model. This fea-
ture supports different gradual implementations that could be
patterned after most current CDS implementations.
In fact, in the aforementioned codification tables, some
semantic conventions have been adopted as summarized
in Table 19.
The adopted conventions define a short set of possible
values in a construct where the universe of the set is well-
known and predetermined. However, some fields are iden-
tifiers that refer to entities that can be values, types, labels,
attributes or functions, instead of the entities themselves,
enabling a much shorter codification and adding agility to
the processing. The references related to attributes, func-
tions, and resources are specified in Table 5. A range of
up to 255 different values has been adopted as example
in most cases. This range is likely larger than needed, and
it can be shortened by design depending on the policy
domain to balance scope and performance. Note that in the
case of local attribute references, the range is related to
the number of conditions. Here, the number of conditions
has been set to eight in the example because 8 is suffi-
cient for most use cases in severely constrained devices
(e.g., C0 CDSs).
Therefore, each entry in this table requires an additional
index table to be specified within the PDM. The PDM
consists of the detailed definition of the policy language and
the adopted conventions, as denoted by the tables depicted
in Figure 9. Specifically, the set of constructs and their expan-
sion is presented (grey), and the bindings with related refer-
ence tables (colourful), are summarized for clarity.
Note that the high compression factor of the policy codi-
fication is predicated on the concept that knowledge is built
into the PDM.
This specific common understanding by E2E peers can
be agreed upon as PDM specifications. In implementations
where the PDM is specified in separate files, their versioning,
modification, provisioning and activation is muchmore agile.
That is, by separating the PDM specification files, better
abstraction and multi-domain applicability can be obtained.
The separate specification of these agreements correspond-
ing to a policy domain enables agile change management.
When there is no explicit representation of its content, these
tables are understood to be implicitly known by both ACS and
CDS peers. However, this option would be rigid, and changes
would be complicated, difficult, and, could easily become
unmanageable.
On the other hand, the files constituting this PDM speci-
fication enable different profiles to be defined through pat-
terning, which improves scalability and flexibility, because,
depending on the resource constraints of the CDSs, resource
granularity and access control policy expressiveness can be
adjusted.
E. RESULTING POLICIES REVIEW
Thanks to the elasticity enabled by the policy language, when
instantiating policies ranging from simple cases to highly
sophisticated ones, the lengths rise progressively. As an
example, four representative samples have been defined as
listed below:
• Sample 1: A policy with no rules comparable in
expressiveness to Ladon, which has been validated in
C0 CDSs [47]. This example might be access granted
to a subject initially authenticated and authorized in the
ACS and then authenticated in the CDS.
• Sample 2: A policy containing one rule with conditions,
somewhat comparable in expressiveness to the existing
DcapBAC approaches The proposed approach enables
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TABLE 6. Codification lengths of four instances of samples.
rich attribute expressions rather than only the simple
matching of DcapBAC. For example, beyond initial
authorization in the ACS and local authentication in the
CDS, access for any maintenance action can be granted
only after ensuring that battery level exceeds a given
threshold.
• Sample 3: A policy with one rule containing both con-
ditions and obligations. This level of expressiveness is
beyond the existing feasible solutions and enforcement
granularity. For example, after checking a local condi-
tion such as battery status while granting any mainte-
nance action, the system status flag or semaphore can be
updated as a reaction enabled by obligations.
• Sample 4: A policywith two rules containing conditions,
obligations and periodic re-evaluation. This level of
expressiveness is far beyond the capabilities of existing
solutions. This example incrementally covers checking
different conditions related to different actions on dif-
ferent resources. For example, it could enforce check-
ing system status attributes before maintenance actions
can occur and/or attempt counter-checking before grant-
ing administration rights, which both highlight its finer
granularity. Additionally, each access may produce spe-
cific reactions through obligations such as updating
system flags to enable transactional controls, updating
counters to enable usage controls, or performing con-
crete remote notifications that enable instant awareness.
For such usable samples, the lengths of specific policy
instances vary depending on the specific field values and
iterations of nested constructs they contain. For each of the
four samples, exemplary Instances of Samples (ISi) have been
considered to calculate specific lengths. Table 6 shows the
detailed lengths of the sample instances and their expressive-
ness, as well as an overview of the gap with respect to the
state of the art.
It is also pertinent to compare the resulting lengths with
the existing representations and serializations of the pol-
icy instances. The samples as represented in JSON and
CBOR result in the lengths shown in Table 7, where
the authorization policy binary representation specified in
Subsection IV-C is denoted by Authorization Policy Binary
Representation (APBR).
Approaches for transmitting and processing JSON format
policy instances, which is the de-facto standard adopted in
CoAP, are much too long. Note that a slight reduction in
JSON representation can be obtained when identifiers and
TABLE 7. Length comparison for different representations in four
instances of samples.
PDM related conventions are applied, but the lengths remain
high. Existing approaches to transmitting and processing pol-
icy instances in CBOR format result in shorter lengths than
JSON, but they are still longer than the proposed approach
because they are not optimized for policy specification and
interpretation purposes. Consequently, the proposed policy
codification, APBR, results in the best compression factor.
APBR is the shortest; therefore, it will have the lowest impact
on storage, transmission and processing. Additionally, look-
ing at Table 6, this proposal presents a feasible solution
that significantly raises the expressiveness of authorization
policies for CDSs.
V. HIDRA MESSAGING PROTOCOL
The components of the access control architecture need to
enable the related authentication and fine-grained authoriza-
tion features, where trusted instantaneous policy provision-
ing in the CDS is required to enable a dynamic life cycle
of expressive policies, as well as to avoid local storage in
the CDS. The protocol supporting such interactions, which
integrates authentication and authorization, is specified in this
section.
The proposed protocol, named Hidra, is based on
Ladon [48], which is a formally validated solution for
establishing E2E security associations through pair-wise
keys, guaranteeing mutual authentication and authoriza-
tion in severely constrained CDSs (C0). Ladon, which is
based on Kerberos, also ensures security properties such
as confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation, and it is
resistant to replay attacks. Additionally, this protocol
addresses further specific requirements related to the envi-
sioned scenario: independence from clock synchronization,
energy efficiency that has been validated in severely con-
strained devices (C0), resistance to message losses and
scalability. However, Ladon lacks policy provisioning and
accounting functionalities. In fact, Ladon enables the trans-
mission of authenticated values for a subject’s role attribute,
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FIGURE 10. Hidra protocol.
but its policy is static: the CDSs have a preconfigured set of
valid attributes. Thus, Ladon is not a flexible solution and
scales poorly.
In the message exchange sequence of the Hidra protocol,
depicted in Figure 10, a novel approach is proposed that can
dynamically include an authorization policy instance to be
enforced in a CDS through modifying one of the messages
defined in Ladon. The second novelty in the Hidra proto-
col is the addition of a pair of messages to enable precise
accounting. A CDS can provide notifications of details such
as who performed what, where and when for every access
request received from the subject. These notifications are
collected, normalized, and treated appropriately by the ACM
in the ACS.
Table 8 presents the terms used as abbreviations and the
notation, while Table 9 details the contents of the exchanged
messages. Because they are based on Ladon, the following
description of Hidra omits a detailed description of the entire
protocol; only the novelties are conveyed.
Both Hidra and Ladon are based on symmetric key cryp-
tography, and they assume that each endpoint owns a secret
key shared with the ACS. The configuration of this key is part
of an initial configuration procedure performed during boot-
strap and conducted in a controlled environment (typically
out of band, for example, through a USB) in all CDSs before
network deployment.
Hidra operations are based on the use of tickets, capa-
bilities distributed by the ACS that contain proof of the
identity of the subject making the request. Tickets are
encrypted so that only the intended entities are able to decrypt
them. Each subject needs a ticket issued by the ACS to
request any resource on the CDS. Therefore, the subject
first authenticates against the ANS in the ACS (see Phase 1
in Figure 3) and obtains a long-term ticket known as a
ticket granting ticket (TGT), through HID_ANS_REQ/_REP
messages (1 and 2). This ticket allows the subject to
securely communicate with the credential manager CM in
the ACS, which is responsible for issuing the actual resource
tickets.
In the ACS, in Phase 2, resource tickets are generated
only for authenticated and preliminarily authorized subjects
through the HID_CM_REQ/_REP messages (3 and 5).
Enclosed in its payload field, the resource ticket includes the
proof of the subject’s identity and any additional attributes
for the subject and context (AttrS , AttrC ) that would be
useful for further authorization. Toward that goal, the ACS
invokes two information stores: a repository of credentials
and active connections used to deal with the freshness of
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TABLE 8. Terminology and notation on Hidra messages.
TABLE 9. Detail of the content of Hidra messages.
tickets and protocol messages, and a repository of authoriza-
tion policies.
When a positive preliminary authorization occurs, before
issuing the resource ticket to the subject, the credential
manager in the ACS sends a message HID_CM_IND (4)
to the targeted resource running on the CDS, specifying
all the information it will need afterward to validate the
request message from the subject. The message is renewed to
include the fine-grained authorization policy with local con-
text conditions, as detailed in the policy language described
in Section IV.
To assure the freshness of this message (4), it embeds
a new key value K iS,CM from a previously generated one-
way key chain [K 1S,CM ...K
N
S,CM ]. The purpose of these one-
way functions on the enclosed key, F(K iS,CM ) = K i+1S,CM ,
is to make it computationally unfeasible to calculate the
inverse function using a transmitted and potentially sniffed
key. When the CDS receives the message, it will compute the
one-way function on the received key (K jS,CM ) and check it
against the last valid key in the previously received sequence
K i+1S,CM , before validating it and storing it as K iS,CM . In fact,
the CDS will successively compute a predefined (L) number
of times on the received key (K jS,CM ), FL(..F1(K
j
S,CM )) =
K i+1S,CM , to make the transmission resilient to eventual packet
losses.
The messages named HID_CM_IND_REQ (4.1) and
HID_CM_IND_REP (4.2), are exchanged to provide the last
value (KNS,CM ) of the key chain in a one-way function series
of length N generated in the ACS every time the sequence is
initiated. The sequence initiation is started by the ACS and
can also be requested by the CDS as a recovery mechanism
in cases where many packets are lost in the network, and
the local attempts to compute consecutive one-way functions
exceed a maximum limit (L).
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The inclusion of the authorization policy in HID_CM_IND
message, which is one of the smallest messages, also aims to
achieve the minimum fragmentation of 6LowPAN IPv6 pack-
ets over IEEE 802.15.4 links by considering the remain-
ing headers and the reduced remaining available payload.
This design decision makes a difference with respect to the
approaches for enclosing the policy in the ticket, which is
included in a larger request message with higher probabilities
of exceeding the IEEE 802.15.4 MTU and the consequent
network overload. The resource in the CDS stores this infor-
mation for a specified time, LifetimeTR, and if the expected
request from the subject is not received before this time
elapses, the resource in the CDS deletes the corresponding
information to avoid overflowing the limited capacity of
the CDS. The authorization policy is codified according to
Subsection IV-C and sent encrypted with the resource’s secret
key. This instant provisioning for every security association
phase or triggered by any global context status assessed in
the ACS enables novel features for the CDS such as policy
updating, either by usage or revocation. The received policy
is locally stored in the CDS until the security association
expires or is revoked by a refresh message.
In Phase 3, the subject requests the establishment of a
security association to access the resources on the CDS using
a HID_S_R_REQ message (6). The subject sends the previ-
ously obtained resource ticket, which identifies the subject as
an authenticated and preliminarily authorized party. The CDS
validates themessage using the information received from the
ACS and makes a granting decision.
After a positive validation and authorization, the CDS
responds to the subject with the message HID_S_R_REP
(7) either accepting the key proposed in the request mes-
sage (subkey) or proposing a new one. Then, the security
association is established for further resource accesses. This
key can subsequently be used to derive further encryption and
integrity keys to be used in further resource accesses.
For each received security association request, the CDS
also sends a newly defined notificationmessage, HID_R_IND
((8) in Phase 4). This message is sent to the ACS along with
the access details to support central logging and to flush
any local record after the acknowledge message, namely,
HID_R_ACK, is received (9).
After a security association is established, when the CDS
receives any further resource access request using the estab-
lished session key, the PDP in the CDS checks the policy
instance to match the proper rule depending on the action
requested on the resource. Then, the conditions (which are
usually local) specified in the matching rule included in the
policy are checked and a decision is made in the PDP. The
resulting granting effect as well as correspondent reactions
due to obligations are performed in the PEP in the CDS. The
PEP also activates the counter and the timer to trigger rule
re-evaluation by the PDP. The response to the requester will
be delivered using the established session key. Additionally,
and depending on the notification policy or the defined obli-
gations, each resource access request may trigger a notifica-
tion message to send activity logs to the ACS for logging,
tracking, accounting and further auditing purposes. Requests
will be evaluated as long as the security association has not
expired in the CDS or no obligation in the CDS enforces it.
Additionally, security association finalization in CDS may
occur as a reaction to any revocation notification such as
exceeding usage limitations or anomalous behaviour detected
from tracking and accounting analyses in the ACM.
Therefore, the proposedHidra protocol supports theABAC
authorization enforcement in two stages. On one hand, fine-
grained preliminary access control is performed in the ACS,
focusing on the attributes of the subject, resource and the
expected action. On the other hand, local access control is per-
formed in the CDS through the instantaneous custom policy
provisioning, which behaves dynamically and avoids having
to store policies permanently. This temporal policy approach
covers not only the establishment of a security association
but also related further resource access control during the
secured session. Additionally, Hidra supports fine-grained
accounting, which is a very valuable feature in the envisioned
scenario.
VI. SECURITY EVALUATION
Hidra, as introduced before, is a security protocol that
enables the establishment of E2E pair-wise keys for mutual
authentication, dynamic multi-step authorization, tracking
and accounting, while ensuring the confidentiality, integrity
and non-repudiation of the messages. Nevertheless, it may
also be the target of security attacks. This section presents
a security analysis of the Hidra protocol under some security
assumptions and threats.
First, key design aspects that make Hidra resilient against
the considered security attacks are conveyed. Then, a for-
mal security analysis of Hidra is done through a systematic
method for verifying finite-state-concurrent systems. This
technique is supported by validation tools so it becomes very
useful for complete automatic checking to ensure the correct-
ness of the design of Hidra at the earliest stage possible.
A. ASSUMPTIONS AND LANDSCAPE OF ATTACKS
Due to the responsibility that the management services have
in the envisioned scenario, nominal access and complete
traceability of the access requests, responses and access con-
trol policies are required. In the considered security model,
attackers have two goals: to gain unauthorized access to
resources in the CDS and to repudiate the authority. Con-
sequently, the proposed access control model is analysed to
determine its resilience against these two threats.
Regarding unauthorized access to resources and authority
repudiation, the typical mechanisms involve modification of
legitimate messages, fabrication of new ones or re-utilization
of old ones.
In the analysed scenario, the origin of the security attacks
can be third parties outside of the protocol or unauthorized
subjects from the same domain. Therefore, an attacker can
be aware of the supporting security configuration or possess
some initial credentials shared with the ACS.
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The information flow of the network is not reliable
because the CDS communicates over wireless links. The
attacker’s profile is defined according to the Dolev-Yao threat
model [49]. Consequently, the attacker can listen to all the
transmitted traffic, generate new messages and replay old
ones. However, perfect cryptography is assumed; therefore,
an attacker cannot decipher encrypted messages without
knowing the corresponding key.
Regarding the trust among the entities in the envisioned
scenario, on one hand, eachCDS, aswell as subjects and other
third parties such as the CM in the ACS, share a secret key
with the ACS, which is a trusted party, as shown in Figure 10.
On the other hand, none of the entities share this secret key
with an attacker, so identity impersonation is not possible,
because alternatives such as tampering and other physical
attacks are not addressed.
1) SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AT DESIGN TIME
Hidra security protocol specifies a message exchange pro-
tocol where some fields are included to be resilient to
aforementioned attacks.
a: RESILIENCE AGAINST MESSAGE FORGERY AND
MODIFICATION ATTACKS
Message forgery and modification attacks, as in Ladon,
are avoided by origin authentication and the integrity of
all the messages. Impersonation is not possible because
only the appropriate entities own a shared key, can
encrypt/decrypt the protected fields, and calculate the
enclosed related MACs of the exchanged messages, as listed
in Table 9.
Focusing on the messages changed in Hidra with respect to
Ladon, the HID_CM_IND message encloses the authoriza-
tion policy encrypted with the secret key of the CDS KR, and
the MAC to check both the integrity of the message and the
proof of the claimed identity. The policy is encrypted to hide
clues from potential attackers concerning the requirements of
the policy to be authorized.
The HID_R_IND message encloses the details of the log
encryptedwith the secret key of the CDSKR, and the response
HID_R_ACKmessage includes an instant nonce, which is an
unpredictable bit string, to correlate IND/ACK messages and
a MAC to check the integrity and the origin authenticity.
b: RESILIENCE AGAINST REPLAY ATTACKS
Replay attacks are based on reusing valid but old protocol
messages and tickets; therefore, message and ticket freshness
must be assured.
After a TGT is issued, the freshness of the HID_CM_REQ
messages is checked through the authenticator field that
encloses an incremental nonce initiated randomly by the ACS
during TGT retrieval. Therefore, the CM in the ACS does not
accept messages with an enclosed NonceS,CM + i value that
does not conform to the expected incremental sequence.
After a resource ticket is issued, the freshness of
the HID_S_R_REQ messages, which enclose the ticket,
is assured because such tickets are valid for only one security
association, and it is validated through the NonceS,R value set
at the reception of the HID_CM_IND message by the CDS.
If the security association is finalized and a subject aims to
establish another one, a new resource ticket is required.
Related to the HID_CM_IND messages, freshness is
checked through the enclosed one-way key K iS,CM , which is
based on the properties of one-way functions as explained in
the Section V. The CDS then, will compute successively the
one-way function (F) over the received one-way key (K jS,CM )
and will check it against the last valid key in the previously
received sequence, F(..F(K jS,CM )) = K i+1S,CM , before validat-
ing it and storing it as K iS,CM .
Finally, related to the HID_R_IND/_ACK message
exchange, freshness is achieved by means of a nonce value
by which the request message can be matched with its
corresponding response (Nonce5), but different HID_R_IND
messages among them are distinguished through another
incremental Nonce6 + i value enclosed in the log fields.
c: RESILIENCE AGAINST REPUDIATION ATTACKS
A user’s authority may be compromised by obfuscating
information regarding the identity of the subject or per-
turbing the relationship between different protocol message
exchanges.
User authority is achieved by enclosing the subject identi-
fier in the nominally issued tickets. Therefore, because imper-
sonation is not possible, the tickets and the fact that they
cannot be reused assures the unequivocal identification and
authority of the subject. In fact, this aspect is closely related
to the origin authentication.
Regarding the tracking of resource accesses, the
HID_R_INDmessage logs each resource request with details
about who has accessed which resource to perform which
action, when, and under which policy rule enforced in the
ACS, including security association establishment as well
as any further resource access. At the reception of the
HID_R_ACKmessage, the CDS can flush local records, rely-
ing on the ACS to manage their storage and treatment. In fact,
the central collection in the ACS, followed by normalization,
correlation and analysis processes, enable both dynamic
unified policy refinement and potential deviation detection.
An immediate reaction to any detected deviation is enabled
by transmitting the HID_CM_IND message enclosing a new
custom policy instance that the ACS will enforce. Therefore,
the newly introduced messages in Hidra enable not only
traceability but also reactivity.
B. FORMAL VALIDATION
Designing security protocols is not straightforward and there-
fore, attacks conducted by intruders derived from the slightest
misconception at design time can be hardly detected without
the support of automated tools. There are several tools to
complete automatic, robust, expressive and rigorous analysis
of security protocols by either searching flaws or establishing
their correctness, and AVISPA [51] has been selected in this
proposal by its scalability and broad adoption.
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FIGURE 11. Hidra protocol simulation snapshot through SPAN tool [50] in AVISPA, including Hidra phases.
In fact, AVISPA is a software tool that supports the
definition of a model of the security protocol to be val-
idated, the verification of the correctness of the devel-
oped model and the proper formal analysis of the security
protocol.
On one hand, the model of Hidra security protocol
is defined through a modular and expressive formal lan-
guage for specifying security protocols and properties, called
High-Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) [52].
HLPSL is a role-based language to define agent profiles, their
states, and transitions, composing several sessions as a set
of agent instances, where an intruder may try to imperson-
ate a legitimate user. For the specification to be complete,
the security goals to be achieved by the protocol must be
specified within the model. In fact, the security verification
checks whether these goals are met or not.
On the other hand, the rigorous specification verification
and security validation checks can be performed through four
different complementary modular back-ends that implement
the automatic analysis techniques ranging from protocol falsi-
fication to abstraction-based verification methods for infinite
number of sessions. These automatic checks are easily feasi-
ble because AVISPA provides an intermediate tool to trans-
late human readable HLPSL model to machine processing
language called Intermediate Format (IF) model. Concretely,
the available checks over the IF version of the model are
performed by On-The-Fly-Model-Checker (OFMC) [53],
the Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe) [54],
SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) [55] and the Tree
Automata based Automatic Approximations for the Analysis
of Security Protocols (TA4SP) [56].
The mentioned back-ends assume perfect cryptography
and that the protocol messages are exchanged over a net-
work that is under the control of a Dolev-Yao intruder [49].
In the worst case, a potential internal attacker belong-
ing to the domain owns a valid secret key shared with
the ACS.
1) HIDRA SECURITY PROTOCOL HLPSL MODEL
The Hidra security model definition is not done starting from
scratch. The AVISPA tool is supported by a broad library
of models of most IETF security protocols. In fact, starting
from Kerberos HLPSLmodel (mutual strong authentication),
the HLPSLmodel of Ladon, which avoids clock synchroniza-
tion and provides basic authorization support, was defined
and the formal security validation of the protocol was pre-
sented in [48]. Therefore, Hidra extends this HLPSL model
including the expressive authorization and accounting just as
detailed in Section V.
Being HLPSL based on roles, five Hidra related basic roles
are defined: the Authentication Server (ANS) in the ACS,
defined for clarity as authnServer (A), the Credential Man-
ager (CM) in the ACS, defined as credentialManager (C),
a communication peer acting as resource (R) in a CDS, a com-
munication peer acting as subject (S) and a log reception
server in the ACS, defined for clarity as logManager (LM).
Each of these roles define the proper known parameters, their
initial state, the transitions and the contribution to the security
goals.
Then, a session is defined as a composition of an instance
of each of the five basic roles and the channels to send and
receive the messages defined by Hidra. Additionally, the top-
level role, called environment, defines global variables and
the intruder’s knowledge and combines several sessions rep-
resenting attacks based on the behaviour of the intruder.
Finally, the security goals to be validated are speci-
fied in the goal section and defined through some goal
facts augmenting the transitions in each involved basic
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role. AVISPA provides useful and concise macros for
the two most frequently used security goals, authenti-
cation and secrecy (secrecy_of ). Authentication can be
weak (weak_authentication_on) or strong (authentica-
tion_on), and the latter extends the former precluding replay
attacks. Therefore, Hidra related security goals have been
defined as follows.
Authentication: the authentication_on security goal is
specified through two goal facts, namely witness and request.
They are specified in every data exchange, so every recipient
authenticates the sender in each message. This way mutual
authentication is enforced, and since strong authentication is
specified it is also verified that no replay attacks can take
place.
Data confidentiality: this property is specified applying
the secrecy_of security goal to all secret keys and secret
values exchanged by peers. Data integrity: this property is
specified applying the secrecy_of security goal to the secret
keys used to calculate the MAC codes defined by Hidra over
the protected data sets.
Authorization: proper enforcement is assumed based on
the confidentiality and integrity of the authorization policy.
Therefore, in the roles of resource and ACS both are spec-
ified, the secrecy_of the provisioned policy as well as the
integrity guaranteed by the MAC code in the HID_CM_IND
message, which is specified through the secrecy_of the key
used to calculate such MAC code.
Freshness: Hidra specifies several nonces for this purpose
and this property is specified applying the secrecy_of secu-
rity goal to them. Additionally, previously specified strong
authentication in AVISPA includes protection against replay
attacks.
Accounting: the secrecy_of the log data sent by the
resource is specified in both roles resource and logManager in
the ACS, and mutual strong authentication is also specified.
It is worthy of note that by cause of HLPSL limitations not
all the properties of Hidra are modelled as expected at design
time. First, the increment of the i value on nonces included
in some messages is not possible because HLPSL does not
support arbitrary arithmetic operators. Alternatively, a hash
function is applied as a shared well-known function over the
same nonce. And second, current version of HLPSL does
not support time-related events such as time-outs, so lifetime
expirations are not specified. Since perfect cryptography is
assumed and cryptanalysis attacks are not considered, it has
been checked that this issue has no effect in the protocol
behaviour and neither the fulfilment of the security goals.
Prior to security validation, Hidra HLPSLmodel is verified
both syntactically and semantically, as well as checking that
it represents properly the Hidra protocol behaviour. First,
the HLPSL format file is successfully loaded and converted
by AVISPA to a machine language format IF as explained
before. Then, SPAN [50] security protocol simulation tool in
AVISPA is executed and Figure 11 shows the resulting mes-
sage sequence chart, which is very useful for visual checking
of protocol semantic and behaviour.
2) SECURITY VALIDATION
The security validation consists of the assessment that the
previously modelled Hidra security protocol meets the stated
security goals. In fact, it is performed through the OFMC
and CL-AtSe back-end modules, which verify whether the
defined security goals are satisfied for a bounded number of
sessions, as specified in the environment role. On one hand,
OFMC uses the lazy intruder technique to represent all the
possible messages an intruder could generate trying to attack
the protocol. And on the other, CL-AtSe, which is based
on constraint solving technique, implements powerful meth-
ods for validation through simplification and redundancy
avoiding.
The TA4SP back-end is not used because it does not
support the type of compound variable set used in the
Hidra HLSPL model, and consequently the provided results
are INCONCLUSIVE. Additionally, the SATMC back-end
results have been discarded since it warns that the intruder
can not generate fresh terms and therefore, such attacks are
not included and provided results are less accurate.
For the validation, first, the Hidra protocol is checked
implementing a single session and allowing all the roles to be
played by legitimate agents (use-case 1). Table 10 shows that
such a session is instantiated involving the five defined roles
(a,c,s,r and lm) denoting authnServer, credentialManager,
subject, resource and logManager respectively. Additionally,
the involved shared keys between peers are specified (K_sa,
K_rc and K_ca), and finally three hash functions are declared
(h, f and mac).
Then the session is modified to test the use-cases in which
the intruder owning a valid secret key shared with the ACS
would try to impersonate each of the legitimate agents: the
subject (use-case 2), the CDS resource (use-case 3), the ANS
(use-case 4) and the CM (use-case 5). Note that the intruder
does not have any knowledge of the secret keys owned by the
mentioned agents.
Additionally, another use-case is tested where two parallel
sessions are executed, and in one of the sessions, one of the
legitimate agents (the subject) is playing a role (CM, use-
case 6) for which is not intended to. Finally, the use-case of
two parallel sessions are executed, and in one of the sessions,
the intruder is playing the role of the subject (use-case 7).
Table 10 shows the configurations of the sessions used to
execute the use-cases described above. After running all the
use-cases, the results are all SAFE, and it can be stated that
the security validation of Hidra is successful with no attacks
detected by the AVISPA tool.
Therefore, it can be concluded that Hidrameets the security
goals defined in AVISPA, so Hidra is a secure protocol for
the mutual strong authentication, the fine-grained authoriza-
tion, the confidentiality and integrity of secret data and the
accounting proposed by current access control model.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, the performance of the access control
model for E2E security in CDSs is evaluated. An analytical
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TABLE 10. Security validation results considering several use cases where intruder is challenging the protocol and performed by two AVISPA back-end
engines, which are OFMC and CL-AtSe.
FIGURE 12. Performance evaluation scenario.
performance model covering the computation of the crucial
performance parameters of such resource constrained sensing
environments is described. First, the reference scenario and
some assumptions are presented, and after the crucial per-
formance parameters have been identified, their computation
is described. Then, an analysis of the analytical model is
presented, describing and discussing the evaluation results.
The overall goal is to demonstrate the suitability of the
designed access control model for CDSs in the envisioned
scenarios.
A. PERFORMANCE MODELLING
To conduct a performance evaluation of the proposed access
control model for E2E security in CDSs, the analytical per-
formance model focuses on three critical parameters: 1) the
response time of the access control model to establish an
authorized E2E secure session, 2) the energy cost of this
model for the protected CDS running on finite batteries,
and 3) the model’s impact on the local storage on the CDS.
The response time needs to be below an accepted value if the
proposal is to be useful, and the energy consumption and local
storage, due to the nature of the CDSs and their constraints on
resources, cannot exceed rational and proportional limits.
1) REFERENCE SCENARIO AND ASSUMPTIONS
The reference scenario for the performance evaluation is
graphically depicted in Figure 12. In this scenario, a sub-
ject is connected to the Internet and establishes an E2E
connection with a resource running on a CDS in an IEEE
802.15.4 network. A 6LoWPAN router (in orange) acts as the
LowPAN coordinator and connects a beacon-enabled cluster-
tree structure to the Internet. The IEEE 802.15.4 network
is 3-hops deep, which is considered significantly large for
validation purposes. The PAN router coordinator has three
child coordinators, which each have another three child coor-
dinators, each of which controls a cluster of six leaf nodes
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where the CDSs expose resources as management services.
Therefore, 54 (3x3x6) CDSs are integrated into the net-
work, but the details of the branches have been omitted from
Figure 12 for clarity.
In this performance evaluation, only the interactions with
the CDSs are considered because they experience the highest
impact due to their scarce resources. Therefore, the delegated
authentication and the TGT obtaining steps are omitted, and it
is assumed that a requesting subject has previously obtained
a TGT before trying to establish an E2E security association
with a CDS.
Regarding the computation to establish the E2E secure
session time, only the delays of the actors involved in the
IEEE 802.15.4 segment have been considered; Internet delays
are ignored because they are commonly some orders of mag-
nitude smaller.
Regarding message transmission, queueing theory forms
the foundation of the model; each transmission generates a
new job in the queue. For the queueing model analysis of
the average service and queue waiting times, only the jobs
corresponding to the Hidra protocol exchanges have been
considered.
With respect to the implementation of the Hidra protocol,
a specific binary codification is used for the exchanged mes-
sages, as in Ladon, to assure its feasibility even in severely
constrained devices (C0).
Finally, and related to the encryption, cipher-text stealing
techniques are adopted, and therefore the resulting cipher-
text has the same length as the corresponding plain text. The
next three sections model the time, the energy cost and the
storage impact of establishing an E2E security association
using Hidra.
2) COMPUTATION OF THE E2E RESPONSE TIME IN THE
SECURE SESSION ESTABLISHMENT
During the establishment of a security association, five mes-
sages are exchanged, as detailed in Section V. This response
time includes the steps where the subject obtains the service
ticket, the notification that the ticket is granted, policy provi-
sioning in the CDS by the ACS, and the security association
request and response between the subject and the CDS.
Concerning the response time computation, four contribu-
tions are considered in each message transmission: the time
required to generate the message in the origin, the network
transmission time, the queue wait time in the destination
and the time required to process the received message. The
computation of each of these delay contributions is specified
below.
a: COMPUTATION OF SERVICE TIMES
The service time comprises the generation of a message
to be transmitted or the processing of a received message.
Executing the cryptographic operations is the most signifi-
cant contributor to this performance indicator. The remaining
operations, such as concatenating fields, reading the received
policy, pattern matching comparisons, determining policy
and enforcing the granting effect, are minuscule compared
with the cryptographic operations. In fact, for the service time
computation based on cryptographic functions, two different
constant bit rates (in bits/s) are adopted in each entity for
encryption and MAC functions, denoted by TCRYPentity and
TMACentity, which depend on the hardware implementation.
Specifically, in CDSs, where resources are very scarce, these
two rates TCRYPR and TMACR are crucial and differentiating
characteristics, and are usually lower than those of the subject
and the ACS.
Therefore, the lengths of the fields enclosed in the
messages directly impact the service computation time.
Table 11 summarizes the lengths of messages in the Hidra
protocol, and the number of bytes that are subject to
cryptographic operations in each interacting entity, denoted
by |CRYP(Messagei)|. A (MAC) label is used to distin-
guish MAC computation from encryption. To compute these
lengths, the assumptions involve 16 bytes for cryptographic
keys, 8 bytes per nonce and two bytes for subject and resource
identifiers.
Equation 1 shows the service time calculation as encryp-
tion time, related to the message i in the entity X,
which is computed based on the aforementioned two
terms, namely, |CRYP(Messagei)| to denote the number
of bytes that are subject to cryptographic operations and
TCRYPX to denote the constant bit rate of encryption
functions.
SXi = |CRYP(Message
i)|
TCRYPX
(1)
b: COMPUTATION OF NETWORK TRANSMISSION TIME
When computing the transmission time, the considered net-
work is the one depicted in Figure 12. To compute the time
required to transmit a message, the main components are the
backoff time (DBOT ) and the data transmission time over the
wireless links (DTx), and it is computed for each of the three
hops of the evaluation scenario (D1, D2, D3). Equation 2
shows the calculation of the transmission time in each of the
three hops:
Dl = DlBOT + DlTx for l = 1, 2, 3. (2)
Therefore, the total transmission time is calculated as fol-
lows:
E[tn] = D1 + D2 + D3 (3)
Other delays that occur, such as the turnaround time from
transceiver transmissions to receiving, beacon transmission
time or inter-frame space have been removed because their
impact is insignificant.
Regarding the back-off time (DlBOT ), before the transmis-
sion, the entities first check whether the channel is free, and
if it is in use, they wait for a time that increases over the
iterations. To compute the back-off time, the model proposed
in [57] has been followed, where both the density of the sen-
sor network and the length of themessages directly impact the
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TABLE 11. Lengths of Hidra protocol messages and number of bytes over which each entity must perform cryptographic operations. The computed
lengths of four different sample instances.
transmission time. Concerning network density, the number
of hops, number of nodes, their roles as subjects or resources
and the mean job generation rate have been considered as the
key parameters.
In addition to the lengths of the messages defined in
Hidra and listed in Table 11, the headers of the lower lay-
ers in the IEEE 802.15.4 network are computed. Specifi-
cally, UDP (8 bytes), IPv6/6LoWPAN (19 bytes), and IEEE
802.15.4 MAC/PHY (15 bytes) are considered. The same
considerations of message length apply to compute the time
needed to transmit each message over the air: a constant
transmission bit rate for all the IEEE 802.15.4 (B) links is
assumed.
c: COMPUTATION OF QUEUE WAITING TIMES
Concerning the queueing analysis, the three entities
(subject (S), ACS and resource (R)) are modelled as
M/G/1 queues. In fact, three of them process messages of
variable length and, therefore, the service time can be repre-
sented with a general distribution. It is assumed that there are
NS = 1 subjects generating requests according to a Poisson
distribution with a mean ratio of λ0 to NR resources running
in the leaf nodes of the network scenario.
First, the mean arrival rates of jobs (λ) for each type
of entity is calculated, considering N as the length of
the one-way key chain used to assert the authenticity of
HID_CM_IND messages.
Then, for each of the three entities (S, ACS, and R), the
average service time (X ) is calculated as the average service
time of the involved messages weighted by the probability
that they will occur, as represented in Equations 4 to 6
respectively.
XS = SS1 + SS2 + SS3 + SS44 (4)
where SSi are the service times related to the genera-
tion or processing of HID_CM_REQ/_REP and
HID_S_R_REQ/_REP messages, respectively.
XACS = SACS1 + SACS2 + SACS3 +
1
N (SACS4+SACS5)
3+ 2N
(5)
where SACSi are the service times related to the genera-
tion or processing of HID_CM_REQ/_REP, HID_CM_IND,
and HID_CM_IND_REQ/_REP messages, respectively.
XR = SR1 + SR2 + SR3 +
1
N (SR4 + SR5)
3+ 2N
(6)
where SRi are the service times related to the genera-
tion or processing of HID_CM_IND, HID_S_R_REQ/_REP
and HID_CM_IND_REQ/_REP messages, respectively.
Finally, considering the resource utilisation as ρ = λX ,
the random variable for the service time of job i as Xi, and
the second moment of the service time as X2 = E[X2i ],
the average waiting time in the queue for each entity is
computed according to the Pollaczek-Khinchin mean for-
mula [58], as shown in Equation 7.
W = λX
2
2(1− ρ) (7)
3) COMPUTATION OF THE ENERGY COST OF
THE HIDRA PROTOCOL
To establish this security association five messages are
exchanged. Additionally, two more messages are exchanged
to send a notification of the subject’s request and the policy
identifier for the corresponding granting effect, as detailed in
Section V.
Regarding the energy cost computation, the energy con-
sumed by communication (either transmission or reception)
of bits over the air and the computation of cryptographic
operations are considered to consume the most energy [59].
Equation 8 shows the calculation of the communications
energy consumption εCx during message reception in CDS X,
based on the energy consumed to receive a message i (εRx).
Here, PRx denotes a constant reception power consumption
and B denotes a constant wireless link data bit rate in the
LoWPAN network.
εCx = εRx = |Message
i|
B
PRx (8)
Equation 9 shows the calculation of the communications
energy consumption during message transmission in CDS X,
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which includes also the energy consumed during the back-
off processes (εBOT ) that is computed following the model
in [57].
εCx = εBOT + εTx (9)
Equation 10 shows the calculation of the energy consumed
to transmit a message (εTx), where PTx denotes a constant
transmission power consumption
εTx = |Message
i|
B
PTx (10)
Regarding the energy consumed to execute cryptographic
operations, Equation 11 shows the calculation corresponding
to the message i in the entity X. The calculation is based
on the lengths of the fields object of cryptographic opera-
tions (|CRYP(Messagei)|), and the cryptographic operation
rate TCRYPX , assuming a constant instantaneous power con-
sumption (PC ) for the computation.
εSxi = |CRYP(Message
i)|
TCRYPX
PC (11)
Specifically, considering εCxi and εSxi as the energy con-
sumed for the communication and the processing of the
messagei in the resource X, and focusing on the received
messages, namely (1) HID_CM_IND, (2) HID_S_R_REQ,
(5) HID_R_ACK and (7) HID_CM_IND_REP, and the trans-
mitted ones, (3) HID_S_R_REP, (4) HID_R_IND and (6)
HID_CM_IND_REQ, Equation 12 shows the calculation of
the total energy consumption in the CDS X to establish a
secure association.
εx = (εCx1 + εSx1)+ (εCx2 + εSx2)
+ (εSx3 + εCx3)+ (εSx4 + εCx4)+ (εCx5 + εSx5)
+ 1
N
(εSx6 + εCx6 + εCx7 + εSx7) (12)
where N denotes the length of the one-way key chain used to
assert the authenticity of HIC_CM_IND messages.
4) PERMANENT AND INSTANT STORAGE COMPUTATION
In this subsection, the increase of permanent storage and the
memory footprint generated by the proposed access control
model are considered. Specifically, the storage and memory
footprint for the instant provisioning of a received access
control policy and the code needed to parse it, as well as the
data blocks related to the messages of the Hidra protocol, are
considered.
On the one hand, regarding the permanent storage for the
mentioned entities, the symmetric key shared with the ACS,
the access control policy, the PDM specification file, the code
to parse the received policy and the code to run the Hidra
protocol are considered the additional minimum entities that
should be permanently stored in a CDS along with some
original resources and sensing applications.
When the PDP and the PEP are implemented as totally
decoupled from the sensing applications they also need to
be stored permanently, and must be considered, but this is
not the usual case in severely constrained devices (C0) where
enforcement is tightly coupled with the sensing application.
On the other hand, regarding thememory footprint, the data
required for the Hidra protocol message exchange are con-
sidered: namely, the key shared with the ACS, the session
keys shared with the subject, the subject identity, the different
nonces, the lifetime of the security association, and the log
of each access provisionally wrapped until the acknowledge-
ment of its reception from the ACS has been received in
the CDS. However, some of these values are loaded and
erased during the reception, processing and transmission of
relatively consecutive messages.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, the analytical models developed in the previ-
ous sections are used to analyse the mean response time and
energy consumption to establish a secure session, as well as
the impact of the expressiveness of the policy on local storage.
No similar feasible approach has been validated to enforce
local context-based access control in severely constrained
devices (C0), but a similar validation has been conducted on
32-bit CPU devices (C2).
1) ANALYSIS SCENARIO
In the Hidra protocol analysis scenario, due to the elasticity of
the policy provisioned during the establishment of a security
association, four sample instances have been selected and
described previously in Section IV: IS1, which is equivalent to
the authorized-if-authenticated or ACL model implemented
inmany severely constrained devices (C0); IS2, which is com-
parable to the existing DcapBAC approaches based on PKC
and has been validated in not-so-constrained devices (C2),
because both check local conditions based on attributes; IS3,
which adds reactive obligations; and IS4, which includes
several rules for different resources and supports periodical
re-evaluation during access. In fact, IS2 enables richer expres-
sions as conditions than previous solutions, and both IS3 and
IS4 go far beyond the existing solutions in the expressiveness
and granularity of access control enforcement.
In fact, considering the direct impact of the length of the
messages in the computation of the response time, energy
consumption and storage, it is worth noting the proportion-
ality of the policy lengths of the four sample instances.
According to Table 11, the lengths of the messages
exchanged during the authentication and authorization pro-
tocol range from 15 to 63 bytes. Enclosing the policy in the
HID_CM_INDmessage, which is one of the smallest, implies
the minimum fragmentation of 6LowPAN IPv6 packets over
IEEE 802.15.4 links as explained in Section V, considering
the rest of the headers, and the reduced remaining available
payload in bytes. This design decision makes a difference
with respect to the approaches for enclosing the policy in
the ticket, which is included in larger request messages.
Therefore, there is a proportional and optimized impact in the
length of amessage from injecting the compressed policy into
the shortest one.
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Additionally, Table 7 shows that, comparatively, the policy
length of the four exemplary instances of samples (up to
32 bytes in the most expressive sample) have much less
impact in the message overload than the proposals analysed
in Section II (up to 391 bytes with CBOR, and 554 bytes
with JSON), that have been validated in not-so-constrained
devices (C2).
In the envisioned scenario, the CDS is accessed by the
subject to perform tasks such as personalization, parametriza-
tion, updating, upgrading, maintenance, and so on. These
types of interactions do not occur often. As the most exigent
scenario, we can consider one that requests access every hour
to tune the user experience in an application where the users
change hourly. Less exigent scenarios could be considered,
such as the parametrization of the CDS at every manufac-
turing shift change or even more-relaxed scenarios related to
preventive maintenance task performed at the end of every
day, week, or month. Moreover, although occasional access
rates are the most typical, this proposal evaluates the impact
in the worst cases.
Finally, to obtain numerical results, specific values for the
parametrisation of theHidra protocol are considered as shown
in Table 12. The lengths of the messages were computed after
considering the changes introduced by Hidra on Ladon [47].
Additionally, both proper cryptographic operation rates in the
different entities and network load profiles such as the net-
work transmission rate, the number of resources, the simulta-
neously requesting subjects and the mean rate of the Poisson
distribution of access requests have been considered.
The encryption and MAC computation rates of the CDSs
are significantly lower than those of non-constrained devices
such as the ACS and the subject; therefore, their impact in the
overall performance of the protocol is considerably higher.
In addition, depending on the specific hardware platform and
the cryptographic algorithm implementation, the rates in the
CDSs may vary notably. Therefore, a broad range of rates
are considered in the impact assessment [60]. Because the
ACS and the subject are not constrained devices, the encryp-
tion and MAC computation rates of these entities have little
impact on the performance of the evaluated protocols. Conse-
quently, the values based on the benchmark results gathered
in [61] have been used here. Overall, the considered rates
in all the devices are very conservative and affordable by
most platforms even in the worst case. Additionally, because
technology tends to evolve, these rates would rise, providing
a positive impact.
Table 13 summarises the different instantaneous power
consumption values used for the analysis. Note that these
power consumption values correspond to a MEMSIC TelosB
mote (TPR2420CA) powered with a 3 V power supply [62].
2) OBTAINED RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
First, the impact of the encryption and MAC computa-
tion rates of the CDSs on the performance of Hidra with
four instances of samples is assessed. For this purpose,
Figures 13a and 13b show the average response time for
TABLE 12. Parameters used to define the operation of the Hidra protocol,
the performance of the interacting entities and the network load profiles.
TABLE 13. Parameters used to characterize the energy consumption of
sensor nodes.
establishing a secure session using Hidra with four different
sample instances.
These two figures show that the maximum response time,
even in the worst case, with the lowest encryption and MAC
computation rate, is below 96ms. This value is extremely low
and is definitely acceptable, considering that the maximum
acceptable delay in interactive data transactions specified by
the ITU-T Y.1541 recommendation (Network performance
objectives for IP-based services) is 400 ms [63]. It must
be noted that aforementioned E2E delay thresholds consider
the time elapsed from when a packet leaves the subject
entity until it reaches the destination entity, while the images
in Figure 13 measure the time needed to fully establish a
secure connection, including all the message exchanges that
establishment implies. In addition, the impact on the response
time is also acceptable even according to the more restrictive
value of 100 ms assessed by Stallings as a good quality for
E2E response time.
Finally, one related comparable response time value has
been found in the literature, although there is no mention
of additional performance indicators such as energy con-
sumption. At the C2 level, [36] reveals that the comparable
measured response time for the authorization response start-
ing when the subject sends the request is 480.96 ms. The
response time of Hidra is much lower and, therefore, much
better.
These two figures also show that improving the encryption
rate has a greater impact on the reduction of the response time
than does improving the MAC computation rate, (also shown
in the comparison in Figure 14).
Attending to the impact on the energy consumption con-
sidering different cryptography and MAC computation rates,
Figures 15a and 15b show the energy consumption introduced
from establishing a secure session using Hidra with four
different sample instances. These figures show that energy
consumption remains under 1.14 mJ even in the worst case,
which is both low and acceptable considering that these
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FIGURE 13. Impact of the cryptographic computation rate on the average response time from establishment of a secure session using Hidra
with four different sample instances, considering the worst case of once per hour as the user request rate. (a) Impact of the encryption rate on
the average response time from establishment of a secure session using Hidra with four different sample instances. (b) Impact of the MAC
computation rate on the average response time from establishment of a secure session using Hidra with four different sample instances.
FIGURE 14. Response time comparison on Hidra with samples 3 and 4.
devices are powered by batteries with capacities of approx-
imately 5940 J (the energy required is approximately one-
millionth part of the total battery energy).
To assess the proportionality of such energy consumption
values (mJ), considering a maintenance use case in which
a complete system status retrieval or where a firmware file
must be uploaded with an average size of about 50 KB,
the energy consumption with the best networking perfor-
mance approaches 150 mJ. In this use case Hidra implies a
1% additional consumption, which is a low and worthwhile
impact.
Figures 15a and 15b also show that improving the encryp-
tion rate has a greater impact on the energy consumption than
does improving theMAC computation rate (also shown in the
comparison in Figure 16).
Comparatively, it can also be pointed out that the evaluated
rates for executing cryptographic operations affect the E2E
response time more noticeably than they affect energy con-
sumption. This confirms that energy consumption in sensor
devices is dominated primarily by transmission and reception
operations, because the instantaneous power consumption
associated with using the radio transceiver is at least one order
of magnitude higher than power consumption corresponding
to CPU use.
Therefore, Figures 17a and 17b show the energy con-
sumption introduced from establishing a secure session using
Hidra with four different sample instances at different session
establishment rates.
On the other hand, Figure 18 shows that the access request
rate has a greater impact on the energy consumption than
does improving the encryption rate. This is because energy
consumption in sensor devices is dominated primarily by
transmission and reception operations.
Finally, from the storage point of view, at the CDS,
the amount of RAM memory is the most limiting aspect,
compared with permanent storage, which is usually an order
of magnitude larger. Compared with Ladon, which has been
validated in severely constrained devices (C0), Hidra addi-
tionally requires loading of the policy parser code, the policy
fields, the logs pending acknowledgement from the ACS and
the corresponding nonce for message pairing.
The policy parser code is highly dependent on the platform
and implementation, involves 48 commands and decisions
that are required to read and load the fields according to the
policy language detailed in Section IV and codified according
to Subsection IV-C.
The policy to be loaded in memory does not expand
significantly compared with the serialized version detailed in
Subsection IV-C. The parsed policy is a set of fields and can
be complemented with some data structures aimed at mak-
ing searches more agile. For example, these data structures
could be hash tables that would speed up rule matching
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FIGURE 15. Impact of the cryptographic computation rate on energy consumption from establishment of a secure session using Hidra with four
different sample instances, considering the worst case of once per hour as the user request rate. (a) Impact of the encryption rate on energy
consumption from establishment of a secure session using Hidra with four different sample instances. (b) Impact of the MAC computation rate
on energy consumption from establishment of a secure session using Hidra with four different sample instances.
FIGURE 16. Analysis of the impact of the cryptographic computation rate
on energy consumption from establishment of a secure session using
Hidra with four different sample instances, considering one per hour as
the user request rate.
for specific request fields. The number of fields depends
on the expressiveness of the policy instance and its length.
The number of fields for the four sample instances are 2,
9, 13, and 44 fields, respectively, for the compacted version
(2, 7, 9, and 32 bytes, respectively). Moreover, richer policies
do not exceed a hundred fields. Therefore, the impact of the
policy parsing computation on the memory footprint can vary
from implementation to implementation but it remains low
and affordable even in severely constrained devices (C0) with
only a few KB of RAM memory.
The same concepts apply to the memory required for
the accounting logs and for the additional nonce used for
message pairing. The number of fields is low (under ten);
consequently, the memory impact is imperceptible.
Regarding the footprint of the code of the policy decision
point and the enforcer, both are usually integrated within
the sensing application code, particularly in very constrained
devices (C0). Their impact may vary, depending on the plat-
form and implementation, but an estimation based on the
pseudocode versions approaches 32 bytes, with 12 required
commands and decisions. On one hand, this code is required
to make decisions based on policy evaluations. On the other
hand, they are required to enforce the resulting granting
effect, the correspondent obligations and the optional rule re-
evaluation timer and counter according to the policy language
detailed in Section IV. Therefore, the footprint of the PDP and
PEP code is considered to be both low and acceptable.
However, with regard to the required permanent storage,
the storage capacity available in C0 devices is much higher
than is the RAM capacity. Typically, this permanent storage
capacity exceeds the size needed to store the symmetric key
shared with the ACS, the access control policy, the PDM
specification file, the code to parse the received policy and
the code to run the Hidra protocol. Therefore, although it
is dependent on the specific implementation, the impact is
considered acceptable.
Additionally, in the case of a planned reset of the CDS
during one of the potential authorized maintenance actions,
the active security association may be retained and saved
to permanent storage by the implementer or by the access
control policy editor through obligations. In these cases, addi-
tional data to be permanently stored are lifetimes, nonces,
Subkeys, K iR,CM keys and the Logs pending acknowledge-
ment. Because the total length is limited to some few dozens
of bytes, the storage requirements do not have a high impact
on the required permanent storage volume.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Incoming smart scenarios enabled by IoT such as smart
homes, smart cars, smart offices, smart grids and so on
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FIGURE 17. Analysis of the impact of the access request rate on energy consumption from establishing a secure session using Hidra with four
different sample instances, considering the worst case of a 50 Kbps encryption rate. (a) Impact of the access request rate for a day on energy
consumption from establishing a secure session. (b) Impact of the access request rate for a week on energy consumption from establishing a
secure session.
FIGURE 18. Energy comparison on Hidra with samples 3 and 4.
envision smart objects that expose services that will be
adapted to user experiences or that will be managed in an
effort to gain higher productivity, often in multi-stakeholder
applications. In such environments, which frequently imply
large scale deployments, smart devices are cheap and there-
fore, constrained. However, they are also critical components
because of the criticality of the information they contribute to
higher-level business processes. Therefore, they must imple-
ment strong security mechanisms.
However, the existing approaches do not adhere to the
principle of least privilege due to the poor expressiveness of
their authorization policies, nor is their behaviour flexible and
scalable. Additionally, no prior proposal supports local condi-
tion checking based on powerful expressions such as compar-
isons, correlations, etc. to supplement simple static attribute
matching. Moreover, no prior proposal enforces additional
reactive activities launched as obligations, providing more
powerful control through policy. Furthermore, the possibility
of iteratively re-evaluating an access control policy during
access has not been considered, nor have accounting and audit
mechanisms been addressed.
Consequently, to the best of our knowledge, the presented
access control model is the first proposal to implement
expressive access control suitable for severely constrained
devices (C0). This novel model tackles the limitations of
current access control approaches for constrained devices
by allowing fine-grained policy enforcement in deployed
sensors based on local context conditions and correspond-
ing obligations. Additionally, to provide control over access
behaviour, policy evaluation and enforcement is performed
not only during the security association process but also
afterwards, while the security association is in use. To avoid
overwhelming local storage resources, such a dynamic pol-
icy cycle requires an efficient message exchange protocol.
For this reason, the Hidra protocol, which implements mutual
authentication, expressive policy injection, tight enforcement
and accounting for further tracking and auditing purposes,
is adopted in this proposal.
Therefore, the proposed access control model described
here is the first to bring similar expressiveness and accounting
features to C0 and C1 CDSs as are available in the current
Internet. The security and performance evaluation concludes
that this access control model is both feasible and adequate.
APPENDIX
POLICY CODIFICATION TABLES
In this section the codification tables mentioned in the
Section IV-C are conveyed to complete the detailed descrip-
tion of the optimization conventions. In fact, policy language
related nested constructs are serialized as shown in tables
conveying expression, obligation, task, attribute, value and
remaining semantic conventions details.
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TABLE 14. Expression codification.
TABLE 15. Obligation codification.
TABLE 16. Task codification.
TABLE 17. Attribute codification.
The expression codification is expanded in Table 14. The
first code is the function id, which refers to a well-known
function as explained in the policy language definition. Then,
the existence of related inputs is specified by an injected Inpu-
tExistenceMask code. When inputs exist, an array containing
at least one input is expected. The number of inputs is
specified by the MaxInputIndex value. The attribute
codification is expanded in Table 17.
The obligation codification is expanded in Table 15. Each
obligation launches a task described in detail in Table 16.
Task launching can be set to always (the default), or be condi-
tional on the rule match evaluation result. When task launch
is set to not always, the FullfillOnExistenceMask bit code is
injected. Then, launching conditioned to the deny or permit
result is specified by the FulfillOn code.
Each task is defined as a function like expressions with
some optional inputs and codified as specified in Table 16.
In fact, the first code is the function id, which refers to
a well-known function as explained in the policy language
definition. Then, the existence of related inputs is specified
by an injected InputExistenceMask code. When inputs exist,
an array containing at least one input is expected. The num-
ber of inputs is specified by the MaxInputIndex value. The
attribute codification is expanded in Table 17.
Attribute arrays are instantiated in tasks and in expres-
sions, both as inputs. Table 17 specifies the details of
attribute codification. The first code specifies the attribute
type, some of which are well-known (e.g., Boolean, byte,
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TABLE 18. Value codification.
TABLE 19. Semantic conventions.
integer, float, and string). The other three types are refer-
ence types and refer to attribute identifiers. These attribute
identifiers refer to attributes available in the request, in the
system, or in currently running expressions, as specified in the
policy language definition. The value codification is specified
in Table 18.
After an attribute is instantiated, a value is mandatory,
with a range depending on the specified type. Note that the
short string is expressive enough to manage string values,
and by design, it limits the lengths of the strings and, con-
sequently, their codification. Additionally Table 19 shows
adopted semantic conventions on values. All of the agreed-
upon definitions, such as the maximum number of elements
in the arrays of rules, expressions, input attributes, obliga-
tions, and so on, which represent a good balance between
functionality and performance, are also included in the PDM
specification in Section IV-D.
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